Orndorff v. Padlo Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 43836 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-27-2016
Orndorff v. Padlo Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
43836
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Orndorff v. Padlo Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43836" (2016). Not Reported. 3027.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3027
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STEPHANIE ORNDORFF, F/K/ A 
STEPHANIE MARTINEZ, 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN PADLO, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
) 
) DOCKET NO. 43836 
) 
) 
) APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in 
and for the County of Ada, Honorable Gerald Schroeder, Senior District Court Judge. 
Trial Judge Honorable Michael Reardon. 
Attorney for Appellant: 
TESSA J. BENNETT, ISB #7424 
LEGACY LAW GROUP, PLLC 
P.O. Box 45130 
Boise, Idaho 83711 
Telephone: (208) 991-2146 
Fax: (208) 392-1418 
Email: tessa@legacylawidaho.com 
Attorney for Respondent: 
STANLEY W. WELSH, ISB #1964 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
1501 S. Tyrell Lane 
Boise, ID 83706 
Telephone: (208) 344-7811 
Fax: (208) 338-3290 
Email: swelsh@cosholaw.com 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STEPHANIE ORNDORFF, F/K/ A 
STEPHANIE MARTINEZ, 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN PADLO, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
) 
) DOCKET NO. 43836 
) 
) 
) APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in 
and for the County of Ada, Honorable Gerald Schroeder, Senior District Court Judge. 
Trial Judge Honorable Michael Reardon. 
Attorney for Appellant: 
TESSA J. BENNETT, ISB #7424 
LEGACY LAW GROUP, PLLC 
P.O. Box 45130 
Boise, Idaho 83711 
Telephone: (208) 991-2146 
Fax: (208) 392-1418 
Email: tessa@legacylawidaho.com 
Attorney for Respondent: 
STANLEY W. WELSH, ISB #1964 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
1501 S. Tyrell Lane 
Boise, ID 83706 
Telephone: (208) 344-7811 
Fax: (208) 338-3290 
Email: swelsh@cosholaw.com 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. 2 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... 3 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................... 4 
I. RESPONSE TO BRIEF RESPONSE TO THE "COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS" SET 
FORTH IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF ....................................................................... .4 
II. RESPONSE TO STEPHANIE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
PROPERLY HELD THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING BOTH DR. WARD'S TESTIMONY AND WRITTEN REPORT ................... 11 
III. RESPONSE TO STEPHANIE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE MAGISTRATE COURT 
PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT I 
.................................................................................................................. 12 
IV. RESPONSE TO STEPHANIE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
PROPERLY HELD THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
EXCLUDING A PORTION OF DR. WATTS' TESTIMONY ........................................ 13 
V. RESPONSE TO STEPHANIE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
PROPERLY HELD THAT THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN AWARDING STEPHANIE PRIMARY CUSTODY OF THE MINOR 
CHILDREN ................................................................................................... 14 
VI. RESPONSE TO STEPHANIE'S ARGUMENT THAT SHE IS ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ....................................................................................... 15 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 2 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES 
Ida.ho Code Section 32-717 .................................................................................................... 8, 9, 10 
COURT RULES 
Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure Rule 719 ................................................. 5, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 3 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONSE TO BRIEF RESPONSE TO THE "COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS" 
SET FORTH IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
fo Respondent's (hereinafter "Stephanie") Brief, Stephanie alleges there was no 
stipulation to conduct a second custody evaluation, that the court never ordered a second 
evaluation, and that John never requested Stephanie participate in a second evaluation. 
Respondent's Brief p. 6. Stephanie claimed Appellant's (hereinafter "John") Exhibit I never 
requested that Stephanie participate in a second evaluation, rather it was only email 
correspondence between counsel, sent one ( 1) week pnor to trial. This is a complete 
misrepresentation of the facts and the Exhibit. 
Exhibit I, which is available for the court's review, contains multiple communications 
dating back to October 2014, months prior to the March 18, 2015 trial date. First, there is a letter 
from John's counsel to Stephanie's counsel, dated October 31, 2014, two (2) days after the 
parties' pre-trial conference, wherein the parties agreed to vacate and reset trial so another 
custody evaluation could be completed at John's expense (Stephanie paid for the first evaluation 
as she was the one requesting that an evaluation be completed). Exhibit I next includes a letter 
from Stephanie's counsel to John's counsel dated November 4, 2014, stating Stephanie did not 
agree to another custody evaluation being completed, despite what had been agreed upon at the 
pre-trial conference (and the only reason trial was vacated). John would have had no reason to 
send the October 31, 2014 letter to Stephanie's counsel, had Stephanie's counsel and the court 
not agreed to vacate the trial so a second evaluation could be conducted. Moreover, there would 
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have been no basis for the court to vacate trial, without a formal motion being filed by John if, in 
fact, the court and Stephanie's counsel had not agreed to vacate trial for the purpose of 
conducting a second custody evaluation. If Stephanie had objected to trial being vacated for a 
second custody evaluation to be conducted, the Court surely would have required that John file a 
formal motion and the matter would have been taken up on the record to address the motion. 
John submits that Exhibit I evidences both the parties' and the Magistrate Court's intent in 
vacating trial to conduct a second custody evaluation. 
At the second pre-trial conference, Judge Reardon stated he would not allow Dr. Watts' 
written evaluation to come into evidence because Dr. Watts had failed to interview Stephanie 
(solely due to Stephanie's refusal to participate in a second evaluation). As a result, there was an 
exchange of emails one (1) week prior to trial (also included in Exhibit I), and Stephanie was 
asked to meet with Dr. Watts' so he could conduct a complete evaluation with her participation. 
In her brief, Stephanie misrepresents the facts and the course of events regarding Dr. Watts' 
evaluation in an attempt to excuse her failure to participate in the evaluation. This is her only 
basis to counter John's argument that Dr. Watts' evaluation and testimony about the best interest 
of the minor children and custody should have been admitted into evidence, despite Stephanie's 
failure to participate in the evaluation as required for a custody evaluation to be properly 
admitted in evidence by the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure Rule 719. 
Stephanie argues that the Appellate Court should not consider statements made in 
chambers and that it is improper for them to be considered on appeal because they are not 
supported by the record. Respondent's Brief p.6. At no point does Stephanie deny John's 
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representations of what occurred at the pre-trial conference; rather she simply claims they should 
not be considered on appeal. John respectfully submits that the Court should consider what was 
said in chambers because that was where the pre-trial conference was held and there is no other 
way to address the matter. One cannot simply look at this case in a vacuum of perfect procedure 
when the best interest of minor children is at stake. Pre-trial conferences typically occur in 
chambers in family law cases, as it is a more informal setting where the court and counsel can 
candidly discuss factual issues and how matters might be resolved short of trial. A party should 
not be punished for the fact that something is not contained in the record when such practices are 
standard. Moreover, a party should be able to rely upon representations and agreements made in 
chambers, between counsel and the court, as all participants are officers of the court and bound 
by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. Such representations should not have to be placed 
on the record or be subject to formal order. If pre-trial conferences should no longer be 
conducted off the record because attorneys cannot be trusted to be truthful and uphold 
agreements made in the presence of the judge, fine; however, John respectfully urges the Court 
consider this case within the context that it actually occurred and with the knowledge that this is 
how the majority of pre-trial conferences are conducted to resolve issues with the court, without 
the formality of formal hearings or taking up additional time in court, and in consideration of 
everything that has occurred, not just what is in the court's formal record. 
Stephanie further claims that John misstated that Exhibit I was excluded on the grounds 
of hearsay when in fact it was excluded based upon relevance. Respondent's Brief p. 8, 27. 
Thought Stephanie's counsel may have initially made an objection on the basis of relevance, 
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Exhibit I was ultimately excluded on the grounds of hearsay. Tr., p.151, L. 13 - p. 152, L. 15. 
Before John's counsel could even respond to the relevancy objection, the Court ruled and 
immediately went on to argue that the Exhibit should be excluded based upon hearsay. This was 
ultimately the basis for its exclusion and found to be an error by the District Court. Opinion on 
Appeal, p. 12. Stephanie wants this Court to focus on bits and pieces of the trial transcript that, 
when taken out of context, misrepresent the proceedings. The exclusion of Exhibit I is a crucial 
issue in this appeal because the exclusion had a domino effect impacting the other rulings at 
issue in this appeal. Had Exhibit I been admitted, John argues Dr. Watts' testimony regarding 
the minor children's best interest and his recommendation for custody, along with his evaluation, 
would have been admitted into evidence which, in turn, would likely affect the court's ruling on 
custody. 
Stephanie also argues that John incorrectly stated he objected to Dr. Ward's written 
evaluation at trial when he did not and cannot raise that issue now on appeal. Respondent's Brief 
p. 7. John objected to Dr. Ward's evaluation and testimony, not his written report (there was no 
need to object to the written report given Dr. Ward's testimony had already been admitted 
despite John's objections). Stephanie then argues that John did not object to Dr. Ward's 
testimony and evaluation, which was presented orally after the court sustained his initial 
objection on the basis of foundation, and that he cannot now raise that issue on appeal. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 7. John did, in fact, object to Dr. Ward's oral evaluation, his opinion 
testimony regarding custody, and his written report at the opening trial and during Dr. Ward's 
testimony. Tr., p. 5, L 22 - p. 9, L 7, Tr., p. 121, L. 11 - 123, L.6. The Court wrongfully 
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admitted Dr. Ward's oral evaluation and opinion testimony because Dr. Ward did not follow the 
proper procedure in conducting his evaluation, that he failed to consider the other children living 
in John's home (whom the minor children consider to be their "sisters"), the minor children's 
adjustment to their home (required under LC. 32-717(d)), and their developmental and emotional 
needs (required under Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure Rule 719), all of which would 
include observing the minor children's interactions with the other individuals living in the home 
including John's fiance, Paulina, and Paulina's children. Through LC. 32-717 does not 
specifically state that "step-parents" and "step-siblings" are to be considered in a custody 
determination, they most certainly are considered, not just those of actual blood from the same 
parents. If courts were to look only at the specific people delineated in I.C. 32-717, a large 
population would be totally disregarded in blended homes all over Idaho, and that certainly 
cannot have been the intent of the legislature in creating the statute, nor has it been how courts 
have interpreted it. To draw a line in this case is not founded in law or reason. Just because a 
class of person is not specifically identified as one that should be considered, the court or an 
evaluator cannot simply fail to consider these individuals, especially if they have a large impact 
on the minor children's lives. The court and an evaluator would certainly consider a registered 
sex offender living in the home, whether family or not, so it is absurd to claim that because John 
and Paulina are not legally married that an evaluator or the court can disregard them in assessing 
the needs of minor children and making a custody determination. And what about the case 
where a grandparent has been living in the home that may be a minor child's childcare provider 
while a parent works? Should a court not consider that child's attachment to a grandparent in 
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setting custody because a grandparent is not delineated in LC 32-717? John respectfully submits 
anyone in the home that has a significant relationship with a parent's minor children should be 
considered and observed by an evaluator. Stephanie tries to focus the argument only on the 
portion of 32-717 wherein it addresses considering specific people in addressing best interest of 
the child. She wholly ignores the fact that looking at a child's adjustment to their home, as is 
required by the statute, would also include looking at who is in that home and how a minor child 
is adjusted to that person or persons. She also brings up the fact that the court was really only 
focused on the continuity and stability of the minor children in deciding custody because all 
other 32-717 factors were otherwise equal. Respondent's Brief p. 15. John respectfully argues 
that considering who is in the home with the minor children, how they are attached to them, and 
how they are adjusted to living with said persons, which would include John's fiance and her 
children, is a large factor in determining continuity and stability. Do the people in the home 
provide continuity and stability? Do those relationships give weight to leaving custody the same 
to promote continuity and stability for the minor children? Stephanie focuses only on what the 
Magistrate Court was presented with in order to argue it was sufficient to support the Court's 
ruling. John's issue is what was not allowed to be presented, what was not considered by the 
court and how that affected its decision. If an evaluator is not going to consider the major people 
in a minor child's life when making a custody recommendation, what is the point of an 
evaluation? Failure to consider collateral witnesses and look at who else is involved in a minor 
child's life on a daily basis is akin to two parents simply going into court and offering "he said, 
she said" testimony, the exact opposite of the purpose of an evaluation, as set forth in Idaho 
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Rules of Faroily Law Procedure Rule 719. 
John argues that prior to 2013, Idaho did not have LC. 7-1126, which authorized and 
required courts to consider LC. 32-717 in making custody determinations in cases where a 
divorce had not occurred, yet that was regularly done even before the statute was enacted. The 
same issue applies here. Saying that, because LC. 32-717 does not require courts or evaluators 
to consider other familial relationships in the home, it does not need to be considered, flies in the 
face of a best interest determination. The purposes of a custody evaluation is to provide the court 
with information it may consider to make decisions regarding custody and parenting time 
arrangements that are in a child's best interest accomplished, among other things, by assessing 
the capacity to parent, and the developmental, emotional, and physical needs of the child. Idaho 
Rules of Family Law Procedure Rule 719 (emphasis added). Looking at the minor children's 
relationships in the home, familial or otherwise, is paramount to assessing their developmental, 
emotional, and physical needs. 
This is not just an issue of considering Paulina's daughters as "sisters;" this is an issue of 
considering the whole of the minor children's lives. Because Dr. Ward failed to consider the 
minor children's lives as a whole (their adjustment to their home, which includes those in the 
home, to assess the developmental, emotional, and physical needs of the minor children), he 
failed to comply with Rule 719 and consider the factors under LC. 32-717. John respectfully 
submits that because Dr. Ward failed to conduct a comprehensive evaluation, as is required, the 
Magistrate Court erred or abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Ward's testimony regarding the 
best interest of the minor children and, in tum, his evaluation (which, again, John needed not 
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object to because the testimony had already been admitted over John's objections). John 
respectfully requests this matter be remanded to the Magistrate Court so everyone involved can 
be evaluated and observed in the best interest of the minor children. 
II. RESPONSE TO STEPHANIE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
PROPERLY HELD THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ADMITTING BOTH DR. WARD'S TESTIMONY AND WRITTEN REPORT. 
Stephanie alleges a procedural defect in John's appeal regarding the admission of Dr. 
Ward's testimony and written report, claiming that John failed to properly object to both the 
written report and Dr. Ward's testimony - that he either failed to object or he failed to object 
after the court requested more foundation be laid by Stephanie's counsel. Respondent's Brief, p. 
19. John did object to Dr. Ward's evaluation, which was presented orally, his testimony, and his 
written report at the opening trial and during Dr. Ward's testimony. Tr., p. 5, L 22 p. 9, L 7, 
Tr., p. 121, L. 11 123, L.6. He did not later object to the written report because all of Dr. 
Ward's testimony, which formed the basis of his written report, had already been admitted 
despite John's objections. The issue was properly preserved for appeal, as agreed by the District 
Court, and thus can be considered by this court. Opinion on Appeal, p. 8. 
As regards the substantive defect, the allegation that Dr. Ward was not required to 
interview/consider Paulina or her minor children and thus John has no basis to pursue the issue 
on appeal (Respondent's Brief, p. 19), John respectfully disagrees. For the reasons already 
argued herein and previously on appeal, John believes Dr. Ward was required, both by Idaho 
Rules of Family Law Procedure Rule 719 and LC. 32-717, to consider Paulina and her minor 
children in conducting his evaluation and that the Court abused its discretion in not considering 
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the same on its own. As this issue was previously argued herein, John will not comment further 
on the matter. 
III. RESPONSE TO STEPHANIE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
MAGISTRATE COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
IN EXCLUDING RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT I. 
Stephanie argues that John's appeal is replete with errors because John failed to 
substantiate his claim that a second custody evaluation was authorized by the Court. John 
exhausted this issue earlier herein, thus nothing else need be said, other than it is a disgrace to the 
practice of law for Stephanie's counsel to submit pleadings to the Court wholly denying 
agreements made in a pre-trial conference in chambers in an effort to maintain a position that 
may be beneficial to Stephanie. 
As regards Stephanie's argument that Exhibit I was excluded based upon relevance and 
not on hearsay, Stephanie misrepresented the Court's ruling and the transcript, and this was also 
previously addressed herein. While Stephanie's counsel objected to the admission of Exhibit I 
based upon relevance, the court ultimately excluded the evidence based upon hearsay. Tr., p. 
151,L. 7-p.152,L.15. 
The bottom line and real issue in this appeal, and what John is respectfully requesting the 
Court to rule upon, is what the Court would like parties to do when one party is authorized by the 
court to proceed with a custody evaluation and the other party refuses to participate. Given the 
rule requires participation by both parties in order for an evaluation or opinion testimony 
regarding custody can be admitted into evidence at trial, anyone can unilaterally refuse 
participation and in turn exclude an evaluation or testimony at trial. There must be a recourse for 
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such action. John respectfully submits that if a party desires to be heard on an issue, they should 
participate in the evaluation. If they choose not to be heard and not to participate in an 
evaluation, then they have to deal with the consequences of that choice and know an evaluation 
will still come into evidence and may not come out in his/her favor because he/she was unable to 
give their side of the situation. John respectfully requests the Court give some guidance as to 
this issue but, more importantly, that the Court find that Stephanie's refusal to participate in the 
evaluation with Dr. Watts did not render his evaluation and opinion testimony regarding custody 
inadmissible, and, therefore, the Magistrate Court erred in excluding the same. 
IV. RESPONSE TO STEPHANIE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
PROPERLY HELD THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING A PORTION OF DR. WATTS' TESTIMONY. 
Stephanie argues that Dr. Watts' written evaluation was properly excluded because John 
never offered it at trial. John did not argue that the written evaluation was improperly excluded 
because he never offered it. Given Dr. Watts' opinion testimony about his custody 
recommendations and the best interest of the minor children was excluded, despite multiple 
attempts by John to have it admitted, John knew he could not get the written evaluation into 
evidence and therefore did not try. The issue on appeal is whether Dr. Watts' opinion testimony 
should have been excluded because he did not interview Stephanie as required for a custody 
evaluation to be properly admitted into evidence pursuant to Idaho Rules of Family Law 
Procedure Rule 719. As previously argued, the District Court found that Exhibit I, evidence that 
Stephanie refused to participate in Dr. Watts' evaluation, was improperly excluded. Opinion on 
Appeal, p. 12. John submits that because the evidence should have been admitted, the 
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Magistrate Court should have considered it in determining whether Dr. Watts' opm1on 
testimony/evaluation should have been admitted. Because the first ruling affects the second and 
the first ruling was in error, the second ruling must then also be in error. 
V. RESPONSE TO STEPHANIE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
PROPERLY HELD THAT THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AW ARD ING STEPHANIE PRIMARY 
CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN. 
Stephanie argues that the Magistrate Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
Stephanie primary physical custody of the minor children because the Magistrate Court had not 
abused its discretion excluding Dr. Watts' opinion testimony and Exhibit I and that, even if they 
had been admitted, the Magistrate Court found the need to promote continuity and stability was 
the most important factor in the Magistrate Court's decision, so no substantial right of John's 
was affected (necessary for reversible error on an appeal). Respondent's Brief, p.33. Stephanie 
wants the Court to focus only on what the Magistrate Court considered and find the Magistrate 
Court did not commit error, however, the issue is what was excluded, not what the Magistrate 
Court considered. The Magistrate Court committed error by not considering all the evidence 
and, thus, was in error. John respectfully submits that if the Magistrate Court had admitted and 
considered Dr. Watts' opinion testimony as to the minor children's best interest and his 
recommendation for custody, the Magistrate Court would have ruled differently on custody, 
including what would promote continuity and stability for the minor children. Because the court 
committed error in excluding Dr. Watts' opinion testimony regarding custody, John's right to 
maintain the custody and care of his minor children was affected. John submits that because the 
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Magistrate Court improperly excluded Dr. Watts' opinion testimony regarding custody and 
Exhibit I, the Magistrate Court committed reversible error. 
VI. RESPONSE TO STEPHANIE'S ARGUMENT THAT SHE 
IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Stephanie argues she should be awarded attorney's fees on appeal because John failed to 
make any cogent legal argument justifying the District Court's decision and that his arguments 
are frivolous. As John argued in his initial brief, because the District Court agreed Exhibit I was 
improperly excluded, the matter should have been remanded. The District Court did not do so 
because it failed to recognize the significance of the exclusion of Exhibit I. Because the 
exclusion of Exhibit I was crucial to John's case and directly affected the Magistrate Court's 
rulings regarding Dr. Watts' testimony and custody, the matter should have been remanded. 
Thus, John's appeal to this Court is not frivolous given the District Court's ruling. Because 
John's appeal is not frivolous, Stephanie is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
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